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OX85 WORKING PAPER № 02  ·  THESIS

Who issues the money?

The three tier contest for onchain settlement, and why the real prize is orchestration
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Between 9 and 16 July 2026, five institutions that do not coordinate with one another moved in the same direction inside eight days. Swift activated a blockchain ledger with seventeen banks preparing live tokenized deposit transactions. The UK Treasury convened a 54 firm tokenization taskforce anchored on tokenized repo. The ECB named its digital euro pilot participants. Japan's largest card network signed with Circle to explore stablecoin acceptance across roughly 40 million merchants. Visa announced a stablecoin platform backing Open USD.

Read individually, these are five unrelated press cycles. Read together, they are five answers to one question. When regulated money moves onchain, who issues it?

For two years the debate has been framed as stablecoins against banks against central banks, a contest for a single throne. The July evidence suggests something else. The three issuance tiers are settling into distinct roles with limited overlap, and the genuinely contested territory is not issuance at all. It is the orchestration layer: the entity that routes value across issuers, jurisdictions and settlement finality regimes. Swift, Visa and the payment aggregators are all bidding for that position.

The contest is not over who issues.
It is over who routes.

1  The Unresolved Question

If banks can tokenize their own deposits and move them around the clock, does the settlement layer position stablecoins built over the last three years survive?

This is not rhetorical. Stablecoins won that position by solving a problem banks refused to solve: value that moves at weekends, across borders, outside correspondent banking hours. Swift's ledger is a direct answer to exactly that problem, delivered by the incumbent, using bank money.

We answer it directly at the end of the framework. First, the evidence.

2  What Actually Happened

Swift activated a shared ledger for bank issued tokenized deposits. On 9 July, Swift announced its blockchain ledger is ready for initial use, with seventeen banks across six continents preparing live pilot transactions: ANZ, BNP Paribas, BNY, Citi, DBS, First Abu Dhabi Bank, FirstRand, HSBC, Itaú Unibanco, Lloyds, Mashreq, MUFG, OCBC, Standard Chartered, UBS, UOB and Wells Fargo. Swift built the system in nine months.

The architecture matters more than the headline. Swift describes the ledger as a secure orchestration layer for bank issued tokenized deposits held on the banks' own ledgers, moving funds overnight and at weekends before completing final settlement through existing systems. Swift is not issuing money and not replacing settlement. It is coordinating between issuers and deferring finality to existing rails. Thierry Chilosi, Swift's Chief Business Officer, framed the ambition as extending the trust and stability of established finance into the frontiers of digital money, naming programmable money and agentic commerce as downstream targets.

On the base infrastructure, early reporting appeared to conflict. It does not. The ledger is built on Hyperledger Besu, an open source client compatible with the Ethereum Virtual Machine, with Consensys delivering the prototype. Its design borrows the zkEVM principles behind Linea, the Consensys scaling network, but it does not run on public Linea. It is a permissioned enterprise network. Chainlink CCIP sits alongside it as the interoperability layer, carrying ISO 20022 messages so instructions can route across whichever ledger or legacy system a given trade requires.

That last detail is the tell. Swift did not build a chain. It built a router, and then bought interoperability for it.

The UK made tokenization an industrial policy. On 13 July, HM Treasury unveiled a tokenization taskforce of 54 firms, including BlackRock, Goldman Sachs, HSBC, JPMorgan, Morgan Stanley and UBS, backed by the City of London Corporation and led by Chris Woolard, former FCA chair. The group will spend a year on live use cases, initially tokenized repo. Woolard's framing is the useful part: tokenized markets are a network game, and it is a race where the UK needs to move at the speed of the most agile players.

The report also confirms the sequencing other jurisdictions are following. The Bank of England will build on its synchronisation pilot in 2028. The ECB equivalent, Pontes, arrives in Q4 2027. John Orchard of the OMFIF Digital Monetary Institute identified the UK's distinguishing commitment as issuing government debt in DLT form, DIGIT, creating a high quality safe asset around which a wholesale capital market can be built. The Federal Reserve, he noted, must navigate the same territory more cautiously given the US prohibition on central bank digital currency.

Private issuance kept expanding in parallel. The ECB selected pilot firms including Deutsche Bank and Revolut for the digital euro. Circle signed a memorandum with Japan's largest card network to explore stablecoin payments across some 40 million merchants. Visa announced a stablecoin platform backing Open USD, introducing competition to Circle from the card networks themselves.

Capital repriced the rails, not the tokens. In the same week, Citadel Securities invested $400 million in Crypto.com at a $20 billion valuation, Alpaca raised $135 million for tokenized stock infrastructure, and Stripe bid for PayPal. Whatever one concludes about any single transaction, the direction of institutional capital in mid July 2026 was toward payment and settlement infrastructure rather than toward assets.

3  The Data That Complicates It

Three figures from June, all from CoinDesk Research, fit neither a clean stablecoins are winning story nor a clean stablecoins are losing one.

Stablecoin market capitalization fell to $312 billion, down 2.39%, a contraction of $7.70 billion. That is the largest monthly decline since the collapse of TerraUSD in May 2022, and the first month end decline in five months. Over the same period, stablecoin trading volume on centralized exchanges rose 10.8% to $981 billion, also the first monthly increase in five months.

These move in opposite directions. Float shrank while turnover grew. The straightforward reading is that stablecoin balances are being held for shorter periods and worked harder, consistent with a shift from a store of value role to a transactional one, and inconsistent with abandonment. The alternative reading deserves naming: the decline in market capitalization coincided with broad ETF outflows and general digital asset weakness in June, so some of the contraction is beta rather than structure. Both can be partly true.

The tokenized side set records. Tokenized real world asset market capitalization reached $30.1 billion, led by tokenized Treasuries at $17.0 billion. Onchain tokenized equity trading volume rose 145% to a record $3.86 billion, catalysed by the SpaceX listing. Tokenized SPCX alone accounted for $1.19 billion, of which Backpack Securities handled $1.08 billion.

For scale, BCG estimates the tokenized real world asset market could reach $88 trillion by 2035, against a current crypto and stablecoin market of roughly $3 trillion. We cite this as a directional claim from an interested party, not a forecast we endorse. Ten year projections in this category have a poor record.

4  Framework · The Issuer Stack

We classify onchain regulated money by who bears the credit risk, because that single variable determines almost everything else: regulatory treatment, who may hold it, what it composes with, and when settlement is final.

Tier 1 · Bank issuedTier 2 · Nonbank privateTier 3 · Central bank
Credit riskThe issuing bank, inside existing deposit insurance and prudential frameworksThe issuer, backed by a reserve portfolio, with no deposit insuranceEffectively none. The sovereign
FinalityDeferred. Movement is instant, final settlement completes through existing systemsImmediate at the token layer. The reserve remains a claim on the issuerAbsolute
AccessPermissioned. Counterparties must be onboarded bank clientsPermissionless, or near permissionless with issuer level freeze capabilityThe most restricted, and politically contested
ProgrammabilityBounded by the bank compliance perimeterMaximal. Fully composable with public infrastructureDeliberately conservative
ExamplesHSBC Tokenised Deposit Service. The seventeen banks on Swift's ledgerUSDC, USDT, USDG, Open USDDigital euro pilot. ECB Pontes. Bank of England synchronisation

The allocation

Mapping the tiers against use cases produces far less overlap than the three way war framing implies.

Use caseLikely winnerWhy
Corporate cross border treasuryTier 1Credit and compliance requirements exclude Tiers 2 and 3. Round the clock movement was the missing feature, and Swift now supplies it
Retail and merchant paymentsTier 2Distribution reach and merchant onboarding cost decide this. See Circle with JCB, Visa with Open USD
Composable finance and collateralTier 2, uncontestedTiers 1 and 3 cannot permit unbounded composability without abandoning their own risk perimeter
Wholesale securities settlementTier 3, with Tier 1Requires a risk free settlement asset. This is precisely what UK DIGIT and Pontes are constructing
Emerging market dollar accessTier 2, decisivelyTier 1 requires a bank relationship, which is the constraint being routed around

The actual contest

If that allocation is roughly right, the three tiers are not primarily competing. They are specializing. Which moves the question to where competition actually sits.

It sits one level up, at orchestration. Someone must route value between a tokenized deposit at MUFG, a USDC balance in a merchant wallet, and a wholesale central bank settlement leg. That function is not a monopoly by regulation, but it can become one by network effect, and it is the position Swift claimed explicitly on 9 July with the words orchestration layer. Visa's stablecoin platform is a bid for the same position from the card network side. The payment aggregators are bidding from the merchant side.

Orchestration is where value concentrates, because it is the only layer that captures flow across all three issuers rather than within one.

The objection worth taking seriously

The strongest argument against this thesis is not that a rival wins orchestration. It is that nobody does.

Routing layers have commoditized before. ISO 20022 is a message standard nobody owns. Internet routing settled into protocols that concentrate almost no value at the routing layer itself, while the endpoints captured everything. If orchestration converges on open standards, value passes through it rather than pooling in it, and the winners are the issuers at one end and the customer facing applications at the other.

Swift's own design makes that outcome more plausible, not less. A permissioned Besu network carrying ISO 20022 messages and leaning on Chainlink CCIP for interoperability is assembled from components that are, by construction, replicable. Its defensibility rests on bank relationships rather than on technology.

Our answer is that the moat here is regulatory and relational rather than technical, and that this is exactly why it holds. Routing regulated money requires being trusted simultaneously by seventeen supervisors, not merely running compatible software. That is slow to assemble and slow to displace. But it is a weaker moat than a pure network effect, and it argues for value that is real yet more contested and lower margin than a winner takes most framing would suggest. If orchestration standardizes faster than it consolidates, this thesis is wrong, and the honest marker for that is the third item on the watchlist.

5  Does The Stablecoin Position Survive

To claim stablecoins are being displaced would overstate the evidence considerably. Float declined 2.39% in a single weak month while transaction volume rose 10.8%, tokenized real world asset capitalization hit a record, and two of the largest payment networks in the world spent July building on stablecoins rather than around them.

But this much is fair. The monopoly is over. Through 2024 and 2025, a stablecoin was the only instrument that was simultaneously dollar denominated, regulated adjacent, and able to move on a Sunday. As of July 2026 that is no longer true, and seventeen globally systemic banks are preparing to prove it. Stablecoins keep a durable and probably permanent advantage in composability, permissionless access and emerging market reach. What they are losing is the enterprise treasury flow they were never structurally positioned to hold, and which, in fairness, most of them never captured.

The more interesting risk to the stablecoin thesis is not competitive. It is relegation to a component role inside someone else's orchestration layer, in which case the economics migrate upward to the router. That is the outcome worth underwriting against.

6  Watchlist

7  Sources

Figures were verified against the linked primary or reporting source. Retrieval date 20 July 2026.

Primary

Reporting and research

On one discrepancy. CoinDesk's 13 July report cites Woolard's projected economic output gain as 33 billion pounds ($44.2 million). The conversion is evidently a typographical error. We have excluded the figure rather than infer the intended value.

This report is published for informational purposes and does not constitute investment, legal or tax advice. Figures are as of the dates stated and may have changed.

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